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Huls and Ramey: Updates from the Regional Human Rights Systems

Updates from the Regional Human Rights Systems
European Court of Human
Rights
In 1959, the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Convention) established
the European Court of Human Rights
(Court). The Court enforces the obligations
entered into by the Council of Europe’s
Contracting States. Any Contracting State
or individual may allege violations of the
Convention by filing a complaint with the
Court.

Governments Have No
Justification to Balance Risk
of Torture Against Threat to
National Security
In Saadi v. Italy, decided on February
28, 2008, the Court ruled that a country
may not deport a person who threatens
national security to a country with a history
of torture. This ruling, hailed as a landmark
case by Amnesty International and other
human rights organizations, contradicts the
policies of countries, such as the United
Kingdom, that send terror suspects to countries that abuse prisoners. Furthermore, the
ruling affirms the absolute prohibition of
torture and other inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.

for assurances that Tunisian authorities
would not subject Mr. Saadi to torture or
other inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment. That June, Tunisia replied that
Tunisian legislation guaranteed prisoners’
rights, and that Tunisia had acceded to the
relevant international treaties.
Mr. Saadi lodged a claim with the
Court in September 2006, alleging that he
would be subject to torture or inhuman and
degrading treatment contrary to Article 3
of the Convention if Italy were to deport
him to Tunisia. He also claimed that Tunisia violated the Article 6 right to a fair trial
by using a military court to convict him in
his absence. Because Mr. Saadi’s partner
and son lived in Italy, he also claimed
that Italy would violate the Article 8 right
to respect for private and family life by
deporting him and thereby depriving his
partner and son from his presence and
support. Finally, Mr. Saadi alleged that his
deportation violated Article 1 of Protocol
7 on procedural safeguards relating to the
expulsion of aliens, and was not necessary
to protect public order or maintain national
security.

Tunisian national Nassim Saadi was
arrested and accused of conspiracy to commit acts of violence in countries other
than Italy, including attacks with explosive
devices. On May 9, 2005, an Italian court
changed the international terrorism charges
to criminal conspiracy, and found Mr.
Saadi guilty of conspiracy, forgery, and
receiving stolen goods. Meanwhile, a military court in Tunisia sentenced Mr. Saadi,
in his absence, to 20 years’ imprisonment
for membership in a terrorist organization.

In its Grand Chamber judgment of February 28, 2008, the Court emphasized that
concern for protecting a population against
terrorism cannot compromise the absolute
nature of Article 3’s prohibition on torture
and other inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment. As a third party intervener, the United Kingdom argued that the
national security threat justified the risk of
torture. The Court said, however, that “the
concepts of risk and dangerousness do not
lend themselves to balancing. [T]he prospect that he may pose a serious threat to the
community . . . does not reduce in any way
the degree of risk of ill-treatment that the
person may be subject to on return.”

After the Italian authorities released Mr.
Saadi in August 2006, the Ministry of the
Interior ordered his deportation to Tunisia, relying on a 2005 Italian law entitled
“Urgent Measures to Combat International
Terrorism.” In response, Mr. Saadi applied
for political asylum, but Italy denied his
application in September 2006. In May
2007, Italy asked the Tunisian government

Furthermore, the Court explained that
for deportation to violate Article 3, Mr.
Saadi only had to show substantial grounds
for believing there was a risk of ill-treatment. Reports by Amnesty International,
Human Rights Watch, and the U.S. State
Department detailing numerous cases of
torture against accused terrorists were
sufficient.
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In light of the probability that Mr. Saadi
would suffer torture or inhuman treatment,
and the fact that Tunisia did not explicitly assure Italy that Tunisian authorities
would not subject Mr. Saadi to ill-treatment, the Court found that deporting Mr.
Saadi to Tunisia would breach Article 3 of
the Convention. While this decision was
explicitly against Italy, it also negated the
United Kingdom’s argument that concern
for national security could outweigh the
risk of torture.

France Cannot Discriminate
Against Homosexuals When
Granting Single-Parent
Adoptions
In January 2008, the Court held that
France could not refuse to authorize a
woman to adopt based on her sexual orientation. The woman, identified by the
initials E.B., alleged that France discriminated against her because she is homosexual. She claimed that Article 14 of
the Convention, regarding discriminatory
treatment, when taken in conjunction with
Article 8 on respect for private and family
life, governed her case.
Despite evidence that members of the
children’s welfare service — including a
psychologist, a technical officer, and the
head of the department — recommended
against E.B. receiving authorization to
adopt because of the lack of a “paternal
referent” and because she had an “unusual
attitude towards men in that men are
rejected,” France argued that the refusal
was not discriminatory because it was not
based, either explicitly or implicitly, on
E.B.’s sexual orientation. Instead, France
refused authorization out of concern for the
child’s welfare because the child would not
have a male role model and because E.B.’s
partner was ambivalent about E.B.’s adoption plans.
The Court noted that there is no right to
adopt in Article 8, other international agreements, or domestic law. The Court further
noted, however, that France went beyond
its Article 8 obligations by expressly granting single persons the right to apply for
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authorization to adopt. Because it extended
its Article 8 obligations, France cannot, in
the application of those extended obligations, take discriminatory measures within
the meaning of Article 14.
In refusing E.B.’s application, authorities consistently referred to her homosexuality. When they did not refer to her sexual
orientation, they mentioned E.B.’s status
as a single person, although French law
makes express provisions for the right of
single persons to apply for authorization to
adopt. Therefore, E.B. experienced different treatment from both couples and other
single persons seeking to adopt. Although
Article 14 says different treatment is not
discriminatory if the difference has an
objective and reasonable justification, in
this case France could not present the convincing and weighty reasons necessary to
justify different treatment based on sexual
orientation. The Court found for E.B.,
awarding her 10,000 Euros (US$15,550)
in just satisfaction and 14,528 Euros
(US$22,590) for costs and expenses.
The Court’s decision, however, was not
unanimous. Only ten of 17 judges found a
violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction
with Article 8. The dissenters emphasized
that the Convention does not provide for a
right to adopt. While the refusal to grant
authorization based exclusively on sexual
orientation is contrary to both the French
Civil Code and the Convention, the dissenting judges asserted that in this case
France had legitimate reasons for refusing
to grant authorization — because the child
would have no paternal role model, and
because E.B.’s partner was ambivalent
about the adoption plans.
Although the decision was not unanimous, the Court did affirm that states may
not discriminate based on sexual orientation. Also, the majority stressed that if a
country expands its obligations, it must
grant those expanded rights to all persons
in an equal manner.

Turkey Responsible for Human
Rights Violations in Case of
Missing Greek Cypriots
On January 10, 2008, the Court found
that Turkey violated the human rights of
missing Greek Cypriots in Varnava and
Others v. Turkey. The decision reemphasized that state authorities cannot ignore

complaints regarding missing persons,
and must conduct legitimate investigations. Furthermore, the Court determined
that the complainants would not receive
monetary damages because the judgment
against Turkey alone should be sufficient
compensation. The case involved the disappearance of nine individuals as a result
of Turkish military operations in July and
August 1974 and the continuing division
of Cyprus.
The Court found, by votes of six to one,
that Turkey violated Articles 2, 3, and 5
of the Convention on the right to life, the
prohibition against torture or inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment, and
the right to liberty and security of person, respectively. The one dissenting vote
came from the Turkish Cypriot judge, who
argued that the Court should have found
the application inadmissible.
The Court found a continuing violation of Article 2 protecting the right to
life because Turkish authorities failed to
conduct an effective investigation into the
whereabouts and fates of the nine missing individuals. Turkey alleged that there
was no continuing violation because the
applicants based the claims on “imaginary
suppositions concerning continuing captivity for which there was no concrete proof
and in respect of which the applicants’
accounts were flagrantly contradictory.”
The Court however emphasized that the
fate of the missing was unknown, and that
the Court had a procedural obligation to
find a violation because there was proof
of an arguable claim that an individual last
seen in the custody of the state disappeared
in a life-threatening context.
The Court also found a continuing violation of Article 3 because the failure to
determine the fates of the missing constitutes continuous inhuman treatment of the
relatives of the nine missing men. Finally,
the Court found a continuing violation of
Article 5 on the right to liberty and security
of person because there was an arguable
claim that the missing had been deprived
of their liberty at the time of their disappearance, and Turkish authorities failed to
conduct an effective investigation into that
disappearance.
Although Turkey was in clear violation of the Convention, the applicants
did not receive monetary damages. The
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Court ruled that the finding of a violation was enough just satisfaction for the
non-pecuniary damage sustained by the
applicants, thereby recognizing the importance of judgments over than monetary
damages in bringing closure to victims’
families. The applicants recovered 4,000
Euros (US$6,220) each for costs. In ruling
against Turkey, the Court reaffirmed the
responsibility of governments to conduct
effective investigations into missing persons cases.
Displeased with the decision, Turkey
filed an appeal with the Grand Chamber,
the Court’s appeals body, in hopes that it
will order the Court to presume the nine
missing men dead, rather than “missing.”
Turkey did embrace the Court’s refusal
to order compensation, as court-ordered
compensation would constitute an unwelcome precedent. In contrast, the Cypriot
government welcomed the ruling, hailing it
as a positive development in the midst of a
“sensitive and tragic” humanitarian issue.

Inter-American System
The Inter-American Human Rights System was created with the Adoption of the
American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man in 1948. In 1959, the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights
was established as an independent organ of
the Organization of American States. In the
1969, the American Convention on Human
Rights (the Convention) was adopted. This
Convention further defined the role of the
Commission and created the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (the Court).
The Commission may recommend cases to
the Court, which determines liability under
relevant regional treaties and agreements,
including the Convention.

Hearings at the Commission:
Case of Lysias Fleury (Petition
12.459) Will Proceed within
the Commission
On March 7, 2008 the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (Commission) heard a report in the Case of Lysias
Fleury, a Haitian human rights advocate.
Mr. Fleury alleges that on June 24, 2002,
Haitian police arrested him at his home,
and pistol-whipped, beat, kicked and forced
him to clean excrement from his cell with
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his hands. He claims that he received this
treatment because of his human rights work
for the Commission Episcopale Nationale
Justice et Paix (Justice and Peace Commission of the Bishops Conference, hereinafter
Justice and Peace Commission).
The Commission admitted the case on
February 26, 2004 under Articles 46 and
47 of the American Convention on Human
Rights (Convention). For the Commission
to grant admissibility and proceed to the
merits, the petitioner must have exhausted
domestic remedies under Article 26(1)
(a) of the Convention. The petition must
also be submitted within six months of the
alleged abuse or exhaustion of domestic
remedies and claim a violation of one or
more of the rights protected by the Convention. States cannot claim non-exhaustion of domestic remedies as a defense if
remedies are not exhausted due to inaction
on the part of the state.
On June 27, 2002, the director of the
Justice and Peace Commission presented
a criminal complaint to the Inspector General of the National Police, and on August
1, 2002 Mr. Fleury requested that the Public Ministry initiate criminal proceedings
against the police officers. Because neither
agency took action, the Commission considered domestic remedies exhausted. In
addition, the Commission determined that
because Haiti did not invoke the failure to
exhaust domestic remedies as a defense in
the first stages of the proceedings, Haiti
waived this defense. At the hearing, however, the state argued that because Haiti
was politically unstable between 2003 and
2006, the government should not be held
responsible for not following through on
Mr. Fleury’s claim, arguing that domestic
remedies are now available. The Commission recognizes the well-established
international law principle of the Doctrine
of Continuity of State, which provides that
changes in government do not generally
relieve a current government from responsibility for past abuses.
The Commission found Mr. Fleury’s
allegations of violations of Articles 5 (providing a right to humane treatment), 7
(protecting personal liberty), 8 (guaranteeing fair trial rights), 11 (protecting privacy)
and 25 (providing a right to judicial protection) sufficiently plausible to warrant proceeding to the merits. On March 7, 2008
the Haitian government and Mr. Fleury,

who is represented by Washington College of Law’s International Human Rights
Law Clinic, presented their positions to
the Commission. During the hearing, Haiti
recognized that the alleged abuses took
place, that it knows the identity of the
police officers, and that no action has been
taken to bring them to justice — in fact,
one officer has been promoted. The Haitian
constitution and other national legislation
provide for domestic remedies, but the
government has so far failed to make them
available to Mr. Fleury.
The Commission will accept additional
memos from the parties and will then issue
a ruling on the merits. The state will then
have two months to respond. The Commission can then decide to issue another
report giving the state a further two months
to respond. If the Commission is not satisfied with Haiti’s response it can submit
the case to the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights.

Decisions of the Court:
Ecuador Deemed Not Complying
with Judgment in Alban Cornejo
y otros vs. Ecuador
The Inter-American Court of Human
Rights (Court) ruled on the case of Alban
Cornejo y otros vs. Ecuador on November
22, 2007. The Commission submitted this
case to the Court on July 5, 2006 after
determining that Ecuador had not satisfactorily complied with its decision of February 28, 2006.
On December 17, 1987 Laura Susana
Alban Cornejo, while in a private hospital
for meningitis, experienced great pain and
was given ten milligrams of morphine,
whereupon she died. The Commission and
Alban Cornejo’s parents alleged violations
of Articles 8 (protecting fair trial rights),
and 25 (providing a right to judicial protection) of the Convention. The Court has
previously held that states are responsible
for acts or omissions committed by any
of their agencies that violate the protected
rights of persons within their jurisdiction.
Ecuador accepted partial responsibility
for violations of the rights protected by
Articles 8.1 and 25.1, arising from various
acts and omissions of state agents who,
by not ensuring that the medical attention
provided was of sufficiently good quality,
did not exercise adequate control over the
hospital. The Court held these rights were
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violated in relation to Articles 4 (protecting
the right to life), 5.1 (providing a right to
humane treatment) and 1.1 (providing an
obligation to respect rights).
The Court also held that the state violated Article 5.1 on independent grounds
due to the lack of judicial response in
clarifying the circumstances of Alban Cor
nejo’s death. The Court found that her
death affected the physical, mental, and
moral integrity of her parents because
they witnessed the medical personnel’s
malpractice and subsequent state inaction
and because Alban Cornejo’s mother was
forced to give up her profession as psychologist to dedicate herself to the search
for justice.
The remedies ordered include the publication of parts of the sentence, the diffusion of information on the rights of patients
under national and international law, the
execution of a training program for judges
and health professionals on national standards, and the payment of reparations and
costs.

Case Update: Compliance with
Judgment in Cantoral Huamaníy
García Santa Cruz vs. Peru
On January 28, 2008 the Court
responded to Peru’s request for an interpretation of the sentence in the case of Cantoral Huamaní y García Santa Cruz. The
Court’s July 10, 2007 decision (see 15 No.
1 Hum. Rts. Brief, 52) held that Peru had
violated Articles 4 (protecting the right to
life), 5 (providing a right to humane treatment), 7 (protecting personal liberty), and
16 (guaranteeing freedom of association) of
the Convention for the kidnapping, torture,
and extrajudicial execution of Saúl Isaac
Cantoral Huamaní and Consuelo Trinidad
García Santa Cruz. In addition, the Court
held that the state violated Articles 5 and
8.1 (protecting fair trial rights), and 25
(providing a right to judicial protection) in
relation to the victims’ families.
The state asked three questions. First,
it asked if the Peruvian judiciary arrives
at a different conclusion from the Court’s
regarding the responsibility of state agents,
will Peru be able to submit a petition for
revision of the sentence? The Court held
this question inadmissible because it was
not intended to clarify the sentence but
rather referred to sentence revision powers
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not granted by the Convention, the Statute, or the Court Rules. Finally, the Court
noted that the sentence in the case established state responsibility, not individual
responsibility.
Second, the state asked if it should
give the sum of $7,500 to the victim’s
widow Pelagia Mélida Contreras Montoya
de Cantoral or to the Mining Federation of
which the victim was Secretary General.
This sum was found in the hostel where
Cantoral Huamaní was staying at the time
of his death, taken by the state, and subsequently lost. Because the Court found that
the question arose out of a doubt concerning the meaning of the sentence, it proceeded to rule on the question. The Court
held that because the victim’s widow was
part of the suit, unlike the Mining Federation, she should receive the money.
Third, the state asked the Court to reexamine whether Cantoral Huamaní’s mother
Elisa Huamaní Infanzón indeed died on
August 17, 1989, six months after her son
was killed. The Court had found this to be
true. The state claimed in its request for an
interpretation of the sentence that she was
still alive. The Court held that this request
was not for clarification, but that it rather
posed a factual question that had already

been considered at the procedural stage
and to which the state had not objected.
Thus, the Court declared this question
inadmissible.

Case Update: Compliance
with Judgment in Escué Zapata
vs. Colombia
On May 1, 2008 the Court examined
the Colombian government’s request for
an interpretation of the decision in the case
of Escué Zapata vs. Colombia. The Court
handed down the decision in this case on
July 4, 2007 (see 15 No. 1 Hum. Rts. Brief,
51). It held that Colombia had violated
Articles 4 (protecting the right to life); 5.1
and 5.2 (providing a right to humane treatment); 7.1 and 7.2 (protecting personal
liberty); 8.1 (protecting fair trial rights);
11.2 (protecting privacy rights); and 25
(providing a right to judicial protection)
of the Convention. German Escué Zapata,
a member of one of Colombia’s 87 indigenous communities and a former mayor
of the city of Jambaló, was taken from his
home by the Colombian military, bound,
beaten, and arbitrarily executed by gunfire.
By asking questions on the decision, the
state extends the period of time in which to
comply with the Court’s sentence.

Colombia has asked the Court four
questions. First, it asked whether a fund
established for the collective use of the
Jambaló community need be a particular
type, such as a fiduciary account or an
inter-administrative agreement. Second,
it inquired whether the state is responsible for costs associated with the victim’s
daughter’s studies if she does not finish
within the normal five years, what its
responsibility is if she is not admitted,
and whether the state can cover lodging,
transportation, and material costs with a
one-time payment. Third, it asked how the
Court’s holding should be published — for
example, which parts need to be included?
Fourth, it asked if litigation costs should be
paid to the victim’s representatives or the
victim’s mother.
HRB
Natalie M. Huls, a J.D. candidate at the Washington College of Law, covers the European
Court of Human Rights for the Human Rights
Brief.
Sara Ramey, a J.D. candidate at the Washington College of Law, covers the Inter-American
System for the Human Rights Brief.

United Nations Update
Newly Formed UN Group
Working to Ensure Rights of
Persons with Disabilities
More than 20 UN departments, agencies, programs, and funds have combined
to create the Inter-Agency Support Group
for the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (Convention) to support measures to ensure the rights of the
world’s 650,000,000 persons with disabilities. The Convention, adopted by the General Assembly at the end of 2006, is only
three ratifications short of the 20 needed
to become a binding international legal
document. When it opened for signature,
40 countries initially indicated their desire
to sign onto the Convention.
The Convention aims to ensure that
persons with disabilities are guaranteed

equal human rights to non-disabled persons. It covers such rights as equality, nondiscrimination, independent living, and
cultural and political participation. The
purpose of the Support Group is to raise
awareness of the Convention in hopes of
securing the remaining ratifications needed
and to create an infrastructure capable of
implementing its goals. To this end, the
Support Group will focus on implementing policies, international cooperative programs, and capacity-building for Member
States, civil society, and the UN, and the
creating a Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
The international community of people with disabilities, as well as disability
advocates and experts, have embraced the
Convention as a way to further the interests
of disabled people worldwide. In some
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countries, disabled people may be denied
the right to open a bank account or to
refuse medical treatment. Article 12 of
the Convention guarantees disabled people
the right to own property, manage their
financial affairs, and to enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others. Some
advocates stress that much work remains
at a domestic level before many countries,
even relatively progressive and developed
ones, can fully implement the Convention.
The European Union has been criticized
as having high levels of unemployment
for adults with disabilities and segregated
school systems for disabled children. Critics warn that so long as disabled people
remain disenfranchised, they will be difficult to represent politically as their voice
will only be heard by proxy. While some
believe that the Convention will help overcome such problems, others suggest that

